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The law and practice surrounding the 
election of local leadership has for long 
been an area under debate in 
Zimbabwe. While Zimbabwe has a long 
history of local government, there is 
considerable tension with regard to the 
role of the national Minister of Local 
Government Rural and Urban 
Development (hereafter referred to as 
the Minister) in local government 
matters. The appointment of “special 
interest” councillors by the Minister 
plays a particularly important role in 
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this debate because of the tension that exists between the imposition of ministerial 
appointments and the concept of a democratically elected municipal council. This article 
examines the legal and policy frameworks surrounding this national instrument. It then 
discusses the content of a number of key regional instruments on local democracy as 
well as the content of the recently adopted Constitution of Zimbabwe. It then presents 
the results of a survey of 20 major urban councils across the country and examines the 
extent to which the law and practice of appointing special interest councillors respond 
to the demands of modern democratic local governance. 
2 SECTION 4A OF THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT  
2.1 Legal framework 
The practice of the Minister appointing special interest councillors to local councils was 
put in place as part of the post-colonial local government reforms. It was initially 
implemented only in rural areas in terms of the District and Rural Councils Act.1 In 
2008, an interparty consensus among the main political parties, namely, the Zimbabwe 
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) as well as the two Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) formations, resulted in an amendment to the Urban Councils 
Act to empower the Minister to appoint “special interest” councillors to every urban 
council.  
In principle, section 4A (1) (a) of the Urban Councils Act enables local voters to 
elect the local leadership of their choice in terms of the Zimbabwe Electoral Act.2 This 
aspect of the law does not envisage any significant influence of the Minister in the 
election of these councillors. However, section 4A proceeds to provide for the 
appointment, by the Minister, of additional councillors, termed “special interest 
councilors”. 
The number of special interest councillors appointed by the Minister with 
respect to a specific urban council may not exceed one-quarter of the number of elected 
councillors of that urban council. Therefore, the higher the number of elected 
councillors in an urban council, the more special interest councillors the Minister may 
appoint. Within the 25% margin, the Minister has discretion to determine the actual 
number of special interest councillors. This discretion includes the discretion not to 
make any appointment.  
Section 4A does not provide for any specific process for the appointment of 
special interest councillors. There is no requirement for the Minister to consult the 
affected urban council or any of the affected local communities. Neither does it provide 
for any criteria to be observed by the Minister in making his or her appointments. 
                                                 
1 S 11 District and Rural Councils Act 1988. See Chakaipa S “Local government institutions and elections” 
in De Visser J, Steytler N & Machingauta N (eds) Local government reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue 
(2010) at 60. 
2 Art 23(1) Zimbabwe Electoral Act 2006. 
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According to section 23(1) of the Zimbabwe Electoral Act, the appointed 
councillors hold office “during the pleasure of the Minister”.3 The duration of their 
tenure is thus determined by the Minister who has an unfettered power to dismiss them 
or have their tenure renewed. There is no reference to any criteria that should underpin 
the Minister’s decision made in this regard. 
The appointed special interest councillors take part in the functioning of the local 
authority and perform the same functions as their elected counterparts. They receive 
the same benefits as their elected counterparts. Their salaries are paid by the local 
authority. Special interest councillors may not vote. However, they are usually very 
influential for two reasons. First, they provide specialist expertise and skills if they were 
appointed on the basis of that ticket. Secondly, they enjoy the personal recognition of 
the Minister and often have a direct line to the Ministry.  
2.2 Policy rationale 
During the introduction of special interest councillors for urban councils, a number of 
arguments were advanced, justifying the measure. They broadly relate to experience, 
multi-party democracy, marginalised groups and corruption. 
 
2.2.1 Bringing experience to the urban councils 
Before 2000, ZANU-PF had not experienced any serious challenges to its rule at local 
level. As a result, there were very few, if any councillors, not belonging to ZANU-PF. The 
election of inexperienced councillors, mostly from the MDC, triggered a debate about 
the need to appoint special interest councillors. The argument was that the integration 
of experienced councillors and other civic leaders would assist to retain continuity of 
council business after the election of the inexperienced MDC councillors.4 
 
2.2.2 Multi-party democracy 
After 2000, the MDC started dominating politics in urban areas. Hence, it was argued 
that limiting the composition of urban councils to elected councillors would not be in 
the spirit of multi-party democracy. The incorporation of individuals from other 
political parties would bring a number of advantages. It would give voice to different 
sections of the local community, bring about cross-fertilisation of ideas in local councils 
and foster a culture of tolerance among different political parties.5 Ultimately, it would 
promote multi-party democracy.6 
                                                 
3 S 4A (2) Urban Councils Act 6 of 2008 (hereafter referred to as the Urban Councils Act). 
4 Shumba P “Special interest councillors ideal but not necessary” SW Africa Radio, 17 SW Africa Radio, 
(2012). Available at http://www.swradioafrica.com/special-interest-councillors-ideal-but-not-
necessary/ (accessed 18 June 2013). See also Grabmore G “Ignorance Chombo's primary aim is to 
frustrate MDC councils” New Zimbabwe Forum, (2012) 4. Available at 
http://forum.newzimbabwe.com/index.php?/topic/57413-even-the-strongest-zanoids-will-be-
shocked/page__st__20 (accessed 26 August 2012). 
5 Shumba (2012) at 3. 
6 Madhekeni A & Zhou G “Legal and institutional framework: The ‘Achilles Heel’of local authorities and 
raison d’etre of ministerial intervention in Zimbabwe” (2012) 2 Journal of Public Administration and 
Governance  19 at 32.  
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2.2.3 Marginalised groups 
In addition, the appointment of different social interest groups within local councils 
would ensure representation of marginalised groups. Bringing in women, persons with 
disabilities and the youth would ensure the representation of their interests in local 
government policy formulation and implementation. 
 
2.2.4 Avoiding corruption 
It was also argued that the appointment of special interest councillors would provide a 
check on the activities of elected councillors, particularly those who might want to 
engage in corrupt practices.7 The Ministry claimed that it was informed by the central 
government’s desire to protect residents from unscrupulous councillors. The ministry 
justified the intervention in local councils as seeking to ‘protect residents’ from the 
excesses of inexperienced MDC councillors.8 
In summary, the introduction of the scheme of appointing special interest 
councillors was based on the expectation that elected councillors would work alongside 
appointed councillors and that they would bring two additional dimensions to the 
council, namely dedicated local government experience and the voice of marginalised 
groups. The councillors would then be appointed on the basis of expertise in specialist 
areas, such as, local government administration, education, health, legal issues, or on the 
basis of them representing the interests of marginalised groups, such as, women, youth 
and persons with disabilities. 
3 THE CONTROVERSY 
Despite the official rationale for the appointment of special interest councillors, the 
appointments are often viewed in a more cynical light and there is little doubt that the 
measure has indeed been controversial.9 
Since the enactment of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act in April 2008, 
numerous elected councillors and mayors belonging to the MDC have been dismissed or 
suspended on the basis of allegations of corruption and/or incompetence. Partly as a 
result of these political difficulties, local government services deteriorated. MDC 
councillors then became easy targets for accusations of incompetence and the 
appointment of special interest councillors over and above elected councillors was 
                                                 
7 Harare Resident Trust “Chitungwiza residents raise concerns with Minister Chombo” SWAfrica Radio 
(2012) 2. Available at http://www.swradioafrica.com/chitungwiza-residents-raise-concerns-with-
minister-chombo/ (accessed 12 June 2012). 
8 Staff Reporter “Mangwana raps 'undemocratic' Chombo’’ New Zimbabwe (2012) Available at 
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-8275Mangwana%20raps%20Chombo%20power/news.aspx  . 
9 Mushamba S “The Powers and Functions of Local Government Authorities” in De Visser J, Steytler N & 
Machingauta N (eds) Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: a Policy Dialogue (2010) at 119. See also 
Shumba (2012). 
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justified on that basis. It has been argued that the Minister sought to discredit the MDC 
councillors as incompetent in order to gain political mileage for ZANU-PF.10 
According to some media reports, the main reason for the appointment of the 
special interest councillors is their utility as spies for the central government. The media 
reports base this on the cases where the Minister suspended or dismissed MDC 
councillors. It is argued that the special interest councillors on the affected councils 
provided information to the Minister about the affairs of those urban councils. As a 
result, the appointed special interest councillors were fingered as the most likely source 
of information for the Minister’s decisions regarding the suspension and dismissal of 
councillors for maladministration or mismanagement.11 
At times, the appointment of special interest councillors caused the deterioration 
of relations between the Ministry and urban councils12 as well as between residents and 
the Ministry.13 In a context where the Minister often resorted to suspending or 
dismissing elected councillors,14 the practice of appointing councillors has angered 
residents and elected councils.15 The Minister has been accused of abusing this power16 
and some local authority councils have threatened to take legal action over the 
appointment of special interest councillors.17  
Furthermore, many urban councils regard their visitors as an unwelcome financial 
burden. The costs of remunerating the appointed councillors are borne by the urban 
council, quite often an expenditure that they can ill-afford.18  
The fact that the Minister’s powers to appoint special interest councillors are 
seemingly unlimited has fuelled the argument that they are being abused. Consequently, 
                                                 
10 Ndlovu N “Zimbabwe: Special interest councillors dismissed” The Standard (2012). Available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201204160265.html (accessed 2 July 2012). 
11 Media reports have highlighted that there has been regular suspension and subsequent dismissal of 
MDC elected councillors as mayors, as cited by the Combined Harare Residents’ Association. See Shumba 
(2012) at 2. The Elected Councillors’ Association of Zimbabwe (ECAZ) “Chombo uses councillors as spies” 
The Zimbabwean (2012) (accessed 12 August 2012). 
12 Staff Reporter “Chombo risks lawsuit” Zimbabwe Daily News (2010). Combined Harare Residents 
Association “Brian James suspension exposes urgent need for local government reform!” (2012). 
Available at http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/zimbabwe/56026/brian-james-suspension-exposes-
ugent.html (2012) (accessed 18 June 213).  
13 Sibanda A “Bulawayo residents and Chombo to clash over special interest councillors” Bulawayo24 
(2012). Available at http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-local-byo-15273-article-
Bulawayo+residents+and+Chombo+to+clash+over+special+interest+councillors.html (accessed 9 
December 2013). 
14 See for example N Machingauta “Supervision of local government” in De Visser J, Steytler N & 
Machingauta N  (eds) Local government reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (2010) at 139-150. 
15 Minister Chombo has, as of January 2012, suspended a total of four MDC councillors in Harare for 
corruption. These were five in Rusape; one in Nyaminyami Rural District Council; two in Zvimba Rural 
District Council; and two in Harare Municipality – Councillors Warship Dumba and Casper Takura who 
had opened a council probe into the question as to why the Minister had acquired so many properties in 
Harare. Brian James became the latest victim. See also Sibanda (2012). 
16 Harare Residents Trust “Chitungwiza residents raise concerns with Minister Chombo” SW Africa Radio 
(2012). Available at http://www.swradioafrica.com/chitungwiza-residents-raise-concerns-with-
minister-chombo/ (accessed 12 June 2012). 
17 Staff Reporter (2010). 
18 S 4A (2) Urban Councils Act. See also Shumba P (2012). 
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the argument has been made that the Minister’s powers should be reduced.19 Before 
assessing this argument, this article presents an overview of regional instruments that 
can be drawn upon to formulate an opinion on the concept of appointing special interest 
councillors.  
4 REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON LOCAL DEMOCRACY 
4.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the essence of the legal framework for the appointment of special 
interest councillors, its stated rationale as well as the controversy surrounding it, this 
article now undertakes a very brief overview of various continental instruments that 
express views on local democracy. This enables a review of the law surrounding the 
appointment of special interest councillors as well as the manner in which it is being 
used. 
A number of regional instruments in operation on the African continent refer to 
the values of local democracy. Four of them are discussed, namely: 
1. the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; 
2. the Commonwealth’s Aberdeen Principles; 
3. the All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation; and 
4. the Victoria Falls Declaration. 
It should be noted that, with the exception of the first, these instruments 
constitute soft law, i.e. they contain commitments made by negotiating parties that are 
not necessarily legally binding in international law. “Soft laws” are characterised by the 
large amount of discretion which is left to the parties bound by the obligation.20 
However, they are not without important legal and political effects. They can be seen as 
the beginning of a gradual process in which further steps are needed to make such 
agreements binding rules for states.21 This is the premise upon which these instruments 
are explored in this article. 
4.2 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG)  
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) came into force 
on 15 February 2012 and seeks “to promote adherence by each State Party to the 
universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human rights”.22 The 
Charter “states the minimum requirements for the observance of democratic principles 
                                                 
19 MISA “Residents wants Chombo's powers clipped” Human Rights-The Zimbabwean (2010). See also 
Combined Harare Residents Association (2012). Available at http://www.thezimbabwean.co/human-
rights/34262/residents-wants-chombos-powers-clipped.html (accessed 18 June 2013).  
20 Grnchalla-Wesiershi T “A Framework for understanding soft law”’ (2001) McGill Law Journal 37 at 88. 
21 Grnchalla-Wesiershi (2001). 
22 Lee R “New era for democracy in Africa”(2012) Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. 
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and the protection of human rights and effective democratic governance in Africa”.23 
The Charter reaffirms the importance of free and fair elections and the need for political 
stability in African states.24 It seeks to promote best practices in the management of 
elections for purposes of political stability and good governance.25 
The ACDEG shows commitment to the decentralisation and democratisation of 
local government by requiring state parties to “decentralise power to democratically 
elected local authorities as provided in national laws”.26 Zimbabwe, being a signatory to 
the Charter is under an international obligation to implement this provision.  
4.3 Aberdeen Agenda 
The Aberdeen Agenda: Commonwealth Principles on Good Practice for Local Democracy 
and Good Governance was adopted at the General Meeting of the Commonwealth Local 
Government Forum, convened in Aberdeen (Scotland) in 2005.27 It emphasises:  
 
The ability to elect local representatives: citizens should be able to elect their local 
representatives in conditions of political freedom. It is important for local representatives to 
reflect the views and needs of the community they serve. We believe that this is best achieved 
through regular/timely local elections which are both open and inclusive. Whatever the means or 
processes of local democracy, the results should reflect the wishes of the electorate. 
 
Despite the fact that it is not a legally binding document, the Aberdeen Agenda does 
make a critical contribution to the body of “soft law” that advocates for local democratic 
practices. With its large contingent of African signatories, the Aberdeen Agenda 
resonates strongly on the African continent. 
4.4 All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD) 
The All Africa Ministerial Conference on Decentralisation (AMCOD) is a permanent 
ministerial forum where ministers in charge of local governance deliberate on ways to 
enhance democratic local governance and share best practices. The AMCOD 
Constitution sets out several objectives which include “to promote decentralisation, 
local governance and participation of citizens and social groups in designing and 
implementing development policies”.28 AMCOD provides for a peer review mechanism, 
through which countries review each other on the extent to which they implement 
decentralisation programmes. AMCOD has initiated the drafting of an African Charter on 
the Values, Principles and Standards of Decentralisation and Local Governance.29 
                                                 
23 Institute for a Democratic South Africa ‘15 Ratifications of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance’ (2012). 
24 Art 35 ACDEG 2012. 
25 Art 2 (13) ACDEG 2012. 
26 Art 3 ACDEG 2012. 
27 The Conference was attended by over 500 delegates from 46 countries, including over 20 ministers 
with responsibility for local government. 
28 Part I (2) AMCOD Constitution 2008. 
29 Art 2, AMCOD Constitution 2008. 
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Zimbabwe is a member of AMCOD and as such should consider itself bound by its 
resolutions and the provisions of its Constitution. 
The AMCOD Constitution calls upon AU member states to enact defined laws that 
empower local authorities to make decisions that address the challenges in the 
respective constituencies. It points out that leadership should undergo a democratic 
electoral process.30 It thus appears to see the appointment of local political leadership in 
a dim light.  
4.5 Victoria Falls Declaration (1999) 
The Victoria Falls Declaration was the result of deliberations by ministers responsible 
for local government and decentralisation, mayors and key stakeholders. The 
Declaration sought to map out a shared vision on local government in Africa and to 
identify action for strengthening further local governments in Africa. Adopted in 1999, 
it is a reaffirmation of Africa’s commitment to decentralisation of central powers to the 
sub-national level and of democratisation of local government. The Victoria Falls 
Declaration emphasises the promotion of democracy and good governance. 
Furthermore, it calls for the local accountability of public office holders by promoting –  
 devolution of power and responsibility to lower echelons; 
 local democracy and good governance, with the ultimate objective of 
improving the people’s quality of life; 31  
 local authorities to be representative of, and accountable to all, sectors of the 
local population, including marginalised and disadvantaged groups;32 and 
 effective community participation in local governance;33 
The Declaration urges sub-Saharan African governments to enact and adopt legislation 
that provides for decentralisation and devolution of power to promote local 
democracy.34 The Declaration is “soft law” and is thus not binding on signatories but 
dependent on the commitment of state parties to adopt the normative framework 
contained in the Declaration. Given that Zimbabwe was part of the group of states that 
signed the Declaration, it is expected to recognise the contents of the Declaration. 
4.6 In Sum 
It follows from the above overview that various regional instruments, both legally 
binding and of a “soft law” character, emphasise the importance of local democracy. The 
strongest indication, both in terms of substantive content and legal force, comes from 
the ACDEG as it contains a commitment on the part of the state parties to decentralise 
power to local authorities that are democratically elected. The Aberdeen Agenda 
provides that local representatives should reflect the views and needs of the community 
                                                 
30 Art 17, ACDEG 2012. 
31 Art 3 (3) Victoria Falls Declaration 1999.  
32 Art 3 (b) Victoria Falls Declaration 1999. 
33 Art 3 (c) Victoria Falls Declaration 1999. 
34 Art 3 (1) Victoria Falls Declaration 1999. 
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they serve and posits that this is best achieved through regular/timely local elections, 
which are both open and inclusive. The AMCOD Constitution points out that leadership 
should undergo a democratic electoral process. The Victoria Falls Declaration echoes all 
these calls and also emphasises that local authorities should be representative of, and 
accountable to all sectors, of the local population, including marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups.  
The next part of this article briefly discusses Zimbabwe’s new Constitution with 
a specific focus on the provisions pertaining to devolution and local democracy. 
Thereafter, the outcomes of a small survey of appointments will be discussed against 
the backdrop of both the regional discourse as well as the new Constitution of 
Zimbabwe. 
5 THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE  
The political and economic crises of the 1990s and the disputed elections of 2008 led to 
the signing of the interparty Global Political Agreement (GPA)35 in Zimbabwe which 
paved way for the formation of the government of national unit (GNU) in 2009. The 
Inclusive Government was a three-year transitional political arrangement during which 
various political reforms would be implemented, including the drafting of a new 
Constitution.36 This Constitution was drafted under the aegis of the Zimbabwe 
Constitution Select Committee (COPAC), approved in a national referendum, adopted by 
Parliament and ultimately signed into law by the President in May 2013. It contains a 
chapter dedicated to devolution. Key provisions of this chapter will be discussed with a 
view to inform the discussion of the Minister’s power to appoint special interest 
councillors. 
The Constitution is unequivocal in stating that Zimbabwe is a unitary state.37 
However, the devolution and decentralisation of powers and functions is listed as one of 
the principles of good governance.38 Section 5 of the Constitution establishes local 
government as a tier of government and within that “urban councils, by whatever name 
called, to represent and manage the affairs of people in urban areas”.39 The system of 
urban local authorities is therefore recognised in the Constitution.  
In a significant shift from the current configuration, the 2013 Constitution 
exhibits a desire to reform local government by empowering local councils and 
enhancing their autonomy. A number of provisions attest to this commitment to 
devolution. The first is found in the preamble to Chapter 14. It contains a strong 
statement that “there must be devolution”. The preamble links this call for devolution to 
various reasons, namely, preserving national unity, preventing disunity and 
secessionism, ensuring democratic participation, ensuring the equitable allocation of 
                                                 
35 Ndlovu-Gatsheni SJ “Elections in Zimbabwe: A recipe for tension or remedy for reconciliation” Institute 
for Justice and Reconciliation (2012). 
36 Art VI, GPA 2009. 
37 S 1 Constitution. 
38 S 3(2)(l) Constitution. 
39 S 5(c) Constitution. 
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national resources, and participatory planning.40 The second is found in section 264(1) 
which provides that “governmental powers and responsibilities must be devolved to 
provinces and metropolitan councils and local authorities which are competent to carry 
out those responsibilities efficiently and effectively”.41 Finally, in what could be termed 
an expression of original power for local authorities, the Constitution provides that a 
local authority “has the right to govern on its own initiative, the local affairs of the 
people within the area for which it has been established, and shall have all the powers 
necessary for it to do so”.42 The precise meaning of these provisions and the extent to 
which they will translate into constitutional protection for local government autonomy 
are as yet unclear. Much will also depend on the jurisprudence that will be developed by 
the Constitutional Court in terms of its jurisdiction to decide on constitutional matters.43  
There is no doubt, however, that the Constitution changes the role and status of 
local government in Zimbabwe. In 2010, Kudzai wrote about the structural 
contradiction in Zimbabwean local government. The contradiction lies in the fact that 
the central government professes participatory and democratic notions in relation to 
local government while holding on to strict central tutelage over local authorities.44 If 
the ambitious rhetoric on devolution in the new Constitution is anything to go by, the 
central government will have little choice but to reform local government to fall in line 
with the spirit of devolution expressed in the Constitution. 
Turning to the manner in which the Constitution treats the issue of councillors 
and elections of urban local authorities, it is apposite to highlight the emphasis put by 
the Constitution on democratic participation as a prominent rationale for devolution.45 
For the first time in the history of Zimbabwe, the constitutional framework envisages 
the ceding of state powers to communities and the incorporation of communities in the 
decision making processes through representative and participatory democracy. 
In terms of the Constitution “[a]ll members of local authorities must be elected 
by registered voters within the areas for which the local authorities are established”.46 
These areas, called wards, are to be demarcated by the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission.47 Elections are managed by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.48 The 
Constitution recognises the importance of elected councillors in the management of 
urban council affairs by stating that “urban local authorities are managed by councils 
composed of councillors elected by registered voters in the areas concerned”.49 Section 
158(2) provides that general local government elections must be held concurrently 
                                                 
40 Chapter 14 (Preamble) Constitution. 
41 S 264(1) Constitution. 
42 S 276(1) Constitution. 
43 S 167 Constitution. See below at para 7. 
44 Chatiza K “Can local government steer socio-economic transformation in Zimbabwe?” in De Visser J, 
Steytler N & Machingauta N Local government reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (2010) at 8. 
45 See for example s 13, Preamble Chapter 14 and s 264(2). 
46 S 265(2) Constitution. 
47 S 160(2) Constitution. 
48 S 239(a)(ii) Constitution. 
49 S 274(2) Constitution. 
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with presidential and parliamentary general elections.50 The Constitution also 
safeguards the democratic nature of the executive leadership of urban local 
governments by providing that they are to be elected.51 
Mayors, chairpersons and councillors may only be removed from office by an 
independent tribunal on the basis of one or more of the grounds listed in the 
Constitution. The grounds for removal of a councillor from office are mental or physical 
incapacity, gross incompetence, gross misconduct, dishonesty, corruption or abuse of 
office or wilful violation of the law. The fact that this power will no longer vest in the 
Minister and that the grounds are limited are clearly intended to be a break from the 
current framework, in terms of which the Minister had wide powers to remove 
councillors.52 Chapter 10 of the Constitution provides a framework for a national civil 
service, to which the employees of local authorities presumably belong. In a clear 
attempt to separate the operations of the state machinery from political parties, the 
Constitution provides that employees of provincial and metropolitan councils and local 
authorities must not be office-bearers of any political party.53 
The Constitution does not make any reference to the appointment of councillors 
by the central government. It is clearly premised on the notion that local authorities will 
be governed by a leadership that is locally elected. To that extent, the Constitution 
follows the call made by ACDEG, the AMCOD and other regional instruments that were 
discussed in the previous section. 
With this new Constitution in place, the question arises whether the law and 
practice of the Minister appointing special interest councillors can pass muster under it. 
Before formulating an answer to this question, this article first presents a review of 
what happens in practice with the appointment of special interest councillors. 
6 SURVEY OF 20 URBAN COUNCILS 
6.1 Introduction 
In order to examine the practice of the appointment of special interest councillors a 
survey of 20 major urban councils was conducted. The objective of the survey is to 
assess whether the practice of appointing special interest councillors conforms to the 
policy objective of injecting special expertise and/or representation of the marginalised 
into urban councils. A further objective is to assess whether the trends suggest even-
handedness on the part of the Minister in considering special interest councillors from 
across the political spectrum. The outcomes will assist in the assessment as to whether 
the law and practice surrounding the appointment of special interest councillors are in 
line with the text and spirit of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
The table below presents the outcome of the survey. It presents the total number 
of elected councillors, the total number of appointed councillors, and the gender and 
                                                 
50 Ss 158(2) and 277(1)(a) Constitution. 
51 S 274(2) Constitution. 
52 See para 2.1 above. 
53 S 266(3) Constitution. 
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political affiliation of the appointed councillors. The final column contains the 
information that could be obtained about the specialist interest or expertise that the 
appointed councillors brought to a council. The survey represents the situation in the 




















M  F ZANU MDC 
Bulawayo 29 7 25% 7 - 7 - All rejected by residents 
Chinhoyi 15 1 7% - 1 1 - Unconfirmed 
Gweru 18 4 22% 4 - 4 - Residents association, persons with disabilities, 
commerce, education 
Kadoma 17 4 24% 1 3 4 - 1 former mayor (m)  
3 females- medical doctor, education, media  
Kwekwe 14 0 - 0 0 0 0 No appointments made 
Marondera 12 3 25% 2 1 3 - Former mayor, former deputy mayor, former 
finance chair 
Mutare 18 4 22% 4 0 4 0 Legal, finance, administration 
Redcliff 9 2 22% 2 0 2 0 Business, artisan 
Shurugwi 13 0 0% 0 0 0 0 No appointments 
Vic Falls 11 1 9% 1 0 0 1 Business 
Harare 46 11 24% 9 2 11 0 1 person with disability,1 residents association, 
1 business, 8 former councillors 
Gwanda 11 2 18% 2 0 2 0 Business, former councillor 
Kariba 9 1 11% 1 0 1 0 Former mayor 
Karoi 10 3 30% 2 1 3 0 Former mayors 
Zvishavane 12 2 17% 1 1 2 0 Business, former mayor 
Masvingo 17 3  2 1 3 0 Disabled, business, education 
Rusape 13 2 15% 1 1 1 1 Former councillor, education 
Chegutu 15 1 7% 1 0 1 0 Former mayor 
Bindura 8 2 25% 2 0 2 0 Former councillors 
Chitungwiza 23 4 17% 4 0 4 0 Business, former mayor, 2 former councillors 
TOTAL 320 57 18% 46 11 55 2 44 skills/expertise 
Table 1: Survey of appointments in 20 urban local authorities 
 
6.2 Assessing the trends 
An assessment of the above sample reveals a number of important trends that are 
presented below. 
 
6.2.1 Arbitrary implementation 
The appointment of special interest councillors does not appear to be a standardised or 
uniform practice. The Minister does not make appointments to every urban council. In 
the cases of the Kwekwe City Council and the Shurugwi Town Council no appointments 
were made, for example. The number of special interest councillors relative to the 
number of elected councillors is not consistent either. On average the Minister 
appointed special interest councillors amounting to 17% of the elected councillors. 
However, in some cities the number of appointments exceeded the permitted 25% 
threshold (e.g. Karoi 30%), while in other areas the number fell far below the 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/VOL 17(2013) 
Page | 171  
 
threshhold (Chinhoyi, Chitungwiza, Kariba and Victoria Falls). In other towns the 
number of appointments coincided with the 25% threshold (Bindura, Harare and 
Marondera). This indicates that the Minister used the discretion to appoint lower or 
higher numbers and sometimes even went beyond the discretion afforded (and 
arguably made illegal appointments). Since there are no criteria for the determination 
of the actual number of special interest councillors, this practice then easily attracts the 
criticism of being arbitrary. 
 
6.2.2 Political favouritism 
The trend in the actual appointments that were made suggests a one-sided use of the 
instrument even though ensuring political pluralism was an important consideration 
behind the introduction of the special interest councillor in urban local authorities. Of 
the 57 special interest councillors appointed by the Minister, two belong to the MDC 
while the other 56 belong to ZANU-PF, the party which the incumbent Minister 
represents. 
 
6.2.3 Accommodation of marginalised groups 
The survey of local authorities suggests that the practice of appointing special interest 
councillors did not result in a marked increase in political participation of marginalised 
groups. The inclusion of special interest councillors could have been an instrument to 
promote the accommodation of marginalised groups, such as, persons with disabilities, 
the youth and women, but out of a cumulative total of 57 special interest councillors for 
18 urban councils, only eight are women and three represent the interests of persons 
with disabilities (Harare, Gweru and Masvingo). The rest of the special interests 
councillors have been appointed on the basis of skills, such as, business, legal, medical 
and educational skills. In the application of this measure, there seems to be no focus on 
promoting the representation of marginalised groups.  
 
6.2.4 Consultation 
As discussed above, the law does not require the Minister to consult residents or local 
councils before appointments are made. The Minister is of course not precluded from 
seeking input from the affected urban council or from consulting the affected local 
communities on the proposed appointment. The survey did not include an elaborate 
analysis of the process leading up to the actual appointments so it is difficult to assess 
with certainty how inclusive the various processes were. However, the fact that local 
residents rejected all of the seven appointed councillors in Bulawayo, combined with 
the fact that media reports castigated the practice, suggests that the practice is, at best, 
unpopular with residents. 
 
6.2.5 Special skills 
Within the limited scope of the survey (which did not include any qualitative 
assessment), it is very difficult to assess the extent to which the appointment of special 
interest councillors contributed to inserting special skills into council affairs. The survey 
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does indicate that in nine out of the 20 local authorities, the appointment resulted in the 
injection of some level of expertise and experience into the council. ‘Business skills’ was 
mentioned five times, while the (rather ill-defined) ‘education’ skill was mentioned 
three times. Other skills mentioned were ‘finance’, ‘legal’ and ‘administration’. Although 
special interest councillors have no vote, their existence as advisors to the councils 
enables councils to make informed decisions on policy formulation and implementation. 
Taking cognisance of these skills and experience, the special interest councillors may 
very well have raised the level of debate and engagement in the local council. However, 
there is no evidence that their inclusion enhanced the quality of decisions made. In fact, 
against the backdrop of a local government system that is struggling to deliver basic 
services,54 it is difficult to argue that the measure has been a resounding success in 
enhancing the quality of local government services. What is more, it is not unlikely that 
the imposition of special interest councillors from a party that is different to the 
majority party in the council may result in inefficiencies. The differences in political 
ideologies of elected and appointed councillors should not be taken lightly. There is 
evidence from media reports that the political rivalry between the elected MDC 
councillors and the appointed special interest councillors, has led to fraught 
relationships that negatively impact upon sound decision making.  
7 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL INTEREST 
COUNCILLORS 
Given its recent adoption, the Constitution adds a critical dimension to the review of the 
law and practice on appointing special interest councillors. The Constitution is now the 
supreme law of Zimbabwe and section 2 makes it clear that “any law, practice, custom 
or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency”.  
Is section 4A of the Urban Councils Act inconsistent with the Constitution? The 
text of the Constitution does not unequivocally rule out the appointment of advisory 
councillors because the general provisions pertaining to locally elected leadership do 
not explicitly prohibit the appointment of external advisory members. Section 274(2) of 
the Constitution stipulates that urban local authorities are managed by councils 
composed of elected councillors. However, the argument could be that this is complied 
with as long as the voting members are elected. The appointed councillors will not 
manage the council. A comparison could be made with the South African legal 
framework for the appointment of traditional leaders as advisory members of municipal 
councils. The Municipal Structures Act provides that the provincial minister responsible 
for local government may appoint traditional leaders to participate in municipal council 
proceedings.55 Similar to the special interest councillors, these additional members do 
not have the right to vote and play no part in the management of the council but they 
operate as advisors to the council.56 It has never been argued that this configuration 
                                                 
54 Combined Harare Residents’ Association (2010). 
55 S 81 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (hereafter referred to as Municipal 
Structures Act). 
56 S 81(2)(c) Municipal Structures Act. 
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violates section 157 of the South African Constitution57, which requires municipal 
councillors to be elected. 
It is argued that section 265(2) of the Constitution presents a greater difficulty 
for the constitutionality of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act. The rule that “all 
members of local authorities” must be elected58 bars the inclusion of appointed 
councillors as members of local authorities. Their advisory status does not prevent 
them from being considered “members”, particularly given the fact that they enjoy all 
other privileges and are remunerated by the local authority. It is thus argued that 
section 4A of the Urban Councils Act is inconsistent with section 265(2) of the 
Constitution. What is the likely consequence of this? It is argued that, barring a repeal of 
the law as part of the reform measures to facilitate the new electoral system, the issue 
falls to be decided by a new Constitutional Court, which will be “the highest court in all 
constitutional matters”. The Constitutional Court makes the final decision whether an 
Act of Parliament is constitutional, and must confirm any order of constitutional 
invalidity made by another court before that order has any force.59 
In addition to the abovementioned interpretation of the text of the Constitution, 
it is argued that the practice surrounding the appointment of special interest councillors 
is inconsistent with the spirit and intention of the Constitution, with its emphasis on 
devolution, transparency and democratic participation. A number of arguments, based 
on the trends in actual appointments, can be advanced in this regard.  
First, the fact that special interest councillors were appointed in some urban 
councils but not in others suggests that the measure is being implemented in an 
arbitrary fashion. This is further supported by the fact that the numbers appointed to 
the various urban councils vary strongly. There appears to be no official explanation or 
rationale for the differentiation.  
Secondly, in regulating the appointment of special interest councillors, the law 
assumes that the Minister will appoint people with the required skills, experience 
and/or expertise but provides no criteria to limit the Minister’s authority to appoint a 
special interest councillor or keep him or her in office. Comparing again to the 
appointment of traditional leaders as advisory members of councils in South Africa, 
there are obvious differences. In the South African context, the provincial minister’s 
discretion to appoint advisory members is limited and it is clear that certain criteria 
(with regard to observing a system of customary law) must be met before someone can 
be eligible to be appointed as an advisory member of a municipal council.60 Under the 
Urban Councils Act, anybody may be appointed as a special interest councillor. As a 
result, the practice has become shrouded in mystery and it would seem that, based on 
the breakdown of the party allegiance of the appointed councillors, appointments are 
made on the basis of political allegiance rather than special skills or special interests. If 
this is compared with the vigour with which section 266(3) of the new Constitution 
                                                 
57 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
58 S 265(2) Constitution. 
59 S 167(3) Constitution. 
60 Section 81(2), read with Schedule 6 of the Municipal Structures Act prescribe the criteria and 
procedure. 
 SPECIAL INTEREST COUNCILLORS IN ZIMBABWE 
Page | 174  
 
condemns the combination of party membership and being a civil servant, it becomes 
clear that the Constitution seeks to part ways with such practices. 
Thirdly, residents are not consulted in the appointment of special interest 
councillors and the instances of appointed councillors being rejected by local residents 
suggests that they do not accept them as legitimate. The law states unequivocally that 
special interest councillors are accountable exclusively to the Minister. In other words, 
they do not represent local interests but rather represent the interests of the Minister 
who appointed them. Lastly, despite the existence of an opportunity presented by this 
provision to promote the political participation of marginalised groups, such as, the 
youth, women and people with disabilities, it appears that advantage was not taken of 
this. While the intention of accommodating marginalised communities may have been 
present in the design of the instrument, the Minister appears to have limited its use to 
the injection of skills and the accommodation of the political interests of his own 
political party. 
Zimbabwe faces a formidable task in implementing its new Constitution. A 
number of institutions will have to be reformed and many laws will have to be revisited 
to bring them in line with the Constitution. It was argued in this article that section 4A 
of the Urban Councils Act should be considered in this review as both the legal 
framework and the practice of the Minister appointing special interest councillors 
appear to be inconsistent with the Constitution. 
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